The Wage Price Spiral by Olivier J. Blanchard
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
THE WAGE PRICE SPIRAL
Olivier J. Blanchard
Working Paper No. 1771




This is a much revised version of "Inflexible Relative Prices and
Price Level Inertia."I thank Andrew Abel, Rudiger Dornbusch,
William Nordhaus, Jeffrey Sachs and Larry Summers for discussions.
Comments by John Sutton and an anonymous referee have lead to
substantial changes.I thank the NSF for financial support. The
research reported here is part of the NBER's research program in
Economic Fluctuations. Any opinions expressed are those of the
author and not those of the National Bureau of Economic Research.NBER Working Paper #1771
Decerrber 1985
The Wage Price Spiral
BSTR1CT
This paper rehabilitates the old wagepricespiral. It shows that, after an
increase in aggregate demand, the process of adjustment of nominal prices and nominal
wages results from attempts by workers to maintain or increase their real wage and by
firms to maintain or increase their markups of prices over wages. Under continuous
price and wage setting, the process of adjustment would be instantaneous ; under
staggering of price and wage decisions, the adjustment takes time. The more
inflexible real wages and markups are to shifts in demand, the higher is the degree





Cairbridqe, W02139For a long time, the "wage price spiral" was a central .lement of macroeconomic
dynamics. An increase in aggregate demand, it was argued, would increase output and
employment, leading firms to desire higher prices and workers higher wages; this
would start a wage price spiral, which would end only if and when this "demand pull"
inflation decreased real money balances sufficiently to return the economy to steady
state. Or the spiral could start from a desire from workers to increase their real
wages, or from firms to increase their profit margins, or from the attempts by both
sides to maintain the same wage and price in the face of an adverse supply shock
these would also start a wage price spiral, lead to "cost push" inflation, and
through the effect of inflation on real money balances, lead to a recession1.
With the advent of rational expectations, the wage price spiral left
centerstage. With rational expectations, workers and firms had to understand that
there could not be a simultaneous increase in all real wages and all markups (of
prices above wages). The effect of an increase in aggregate demand was to increase
nominal wages and prices simultaneously and instantaneously, in order to decrease
real money balances and leave output unchanged. The same reasoning applied to supply
shocks.: workers and firms had to understand that either real wages or profit margins
or both had to decrease; the adjustment was instantaneous. Gone were the wage price
spiral dynamics2.
The proposition of this paper is that the wage price spiral should make a
comeback, or more precisely that wage price spiral dynamics are likely to be present
in any economy in which not all price and wage decisions are taken simultaneously. To
make this point, the paper builds a model which is based on two main assumptions. The
first is monopolistic competition in the goods and labor markets ; monopolistic
competition gives the simplest acceptable price setting environment to examine such
issues. The second is staggering of price and wage decisions. These two assumptions2
together generate dynamics very similar to those described above .Moreprecisely, in
this model
Price level dynamics are indeed the result of attempts by workers to maintain
(or increase or decrease as the case may be) their real wage and by firms to maintain
(or increase or decrease) their markups. Furthermore, there is a direct relation
between the inflexibility of real wages and markups to shifts in demand and the
degree of price level inertia. The smaller the effect of shifts in the demand for
goods on the markup, and the smaller the effect of shifts in the demand for labor on
the real wage, the more slowly will the nominal price level adjust to offset
aggregate demand disturbances.
As the nominal price level adjusts slowly to its equilibrium value, changes in
nominal money have long lasting effects on real money and aggregate demand. If
movements in aggregate demand are not too large, in a sense to be made precise later,
aggregate demand determines outputsuppliers willingly accomodate the increased
demand for goods and labor.
Finally, if the economy is predominantly affected by aggregate demand shocks,
there is, as a first approximation, no relation between output and real wage
movements. In response for example to an increase in nominal money, output
temporarily increases before returning back to its equilibrium level ; during this
adjustment process, the real wage is neither systematically lower nor higher but
simply oscillates around its equilibrium value.
The paper is organised as follows. Section I characterises the equilibrium in
the absence of staggering, Section II introduces staggering and characterises the
dynamic effects of changes in nominal money. Section Ill presents conclusions and
suggests extensions.3
I. A Price SettingModeL
If we are to introduce later staggering of price decisions, we must have a model
in which price decisions are not taken by an auctioneer but by economic agent;. As we
want to focus on the real wage, we need a model with labor and goods markets. We want
agents to choose prices and wages, but no single agent to choose either the aggregate
price or wage level ; the simplest assumption is to have many goods, all of them
imperfect substitutes, and many types of labor, all of them also imperfect
substitutes. Thus, we choose a model with monopolistic competition in the goods and
the labor markets.
1) The Price and Wage Rules
I have derived elsewhere the equilibrium of an economy with monopolistic
competition in the labor and the goods markets, starting from utility and profit
maximisation [Blanchard and Kiyotaki, 1985). I shall start here directly from the
demand functions and the equilibrium price and wage rules ; they are sufficiently
simple and intuitive that little is lost by not reporting the details of the
derivation.
There are m firms, each producing a different good, indexed by i =1,...,m
good i has nominal price Pi. There are n unions, each supplying a different type of
labor, indexed by j 1,... ,n 3; labor of type i nas nominal wage W1. The demand
functions for each type of good i and each type of labor J are given by4
-6
(1) =K(M/P) (Pt/P) ; 0 > 1; =1,...,in
-•0•
(2) =KN (M/P)(W3/W) ; 1; o > 1; j 1,...
where the price and wage indices P and W are given by
m i—s i i— i
(3) P (1EP ) 1—6 ; W (1E W ) 1—u
m i1 n j1
The demand for good I, y, is a function of real money balances (M/P) and of the
nominal price P relative to the price level P, which is an index of all nominal
prices. The elasticity of demand with respect to the relative price is given by 8.
The demand for type of labor j, N, is a derived demand by firms. It depends on
the demand for goods and thus on real money balances ; oisthe inverse of the degree
of returns to scale and is thus the elasticity of the overall demand for labor with
respect to real money balances. The demand for a specific type of labor j also
depends on the nominal wage W. relative to the nominal wage level W, which is an
index of all nominal wages. The elasticity of demand with respect to the relative
wage is given by o. The letters K and K11 are constants which depend on the
parameters of technology and utility ; they play no important role in what follows.
The price and wage rules are given in turn by i
U-1 1
(4)(P /P) =(K(8/ (6—1)) (W/P> (M/P)) l+O(U—l) 1=1,...
U(i) 1
(5)(W /W) (K1.. (a! (u—I)) (P/W) (M/P) ) 1+u (—15
Consider the pricerule first,Each firm is a monopolist, facing a demand
+unction given by equation (1). The price rule depends on two parameters,and 8.
The parameteris the inverse of the degree of returns to scale to labor ; if firms
acted competitively, (cc—i) would be the elasticity of output supply with respect to
the price. The parameter $ is the elasticity of demand with respect to the relative
price. To guarantee the existence of an interior maximum to profit maximisation, ccis
assumed greater than or equal to unity and 8 is assumed to be strictly greater than
unity4.
An increase in the real wage shifts the marginal cost curve upward, leading to
an increase in the relative price. An increase in (M/P) shifts the demand curve out,
leading under decreasing returns, to an increase in the relative price. Under
constant returns however, the firm accomodates the increase at an unchanged relative
price. The constant term has been written as the product of a constant Kand a term
(e/($—1)) for reasons which will be clear below. K depends on the various structural
parameters ;(81(8—i))isthe ratio of price to marginal cost and reflect! the degree
of monopoly power of each firm in its market.
Consider now theg_rule. Each union is also a monopolist, maximising labor
income minus the disutility of work, subject to the demand function for labor given
by equation (2). The wage rule depends on two parameters1 p and .(p—i)is the
elasticity of marginal disutility of work with respect to employment. The parameter
is the elasticity of demand with respect to the relative wage. To guarantee the
existence of an interior maximum to utility inaximisation, l is assumed equal to or
greater than unity, is assumed to be strictly greater than unity.
At a given relative wage W/W, an increase in W/P increases the real wage
received by union j, Wi/P; this increase in the real wage leads the union to want toa
supply core labor, thus to decrease its relative wage. Thus an increase in W/P
decreases the relative wage (W/W). An increase in (M/P) increases the derived demand
for labor and leads, under increasing disutility of work, to a higher relative wage
if is equal to unity however, the union supplies more labor at the same relative
wage. The constant term is again separated in two terms ; the first depends on
structural parameters and the second reflects the degree of monopoly power of each
union in its market.
We shall later on be interested in fluctuations of aggregate output. Note that,
from equations (1) and (3), aggregate output ii given by
() V( E P Y)/P =K (M/P)
i =1
where 1< is a constantaggregate output is proportional to real money balances.
2) The Equilibrium
In equilibrium, symmetry, both across price setters and wage setters, implies
that all relative prices and all relative wages must be equal to unity. Using P =P
for all i and W =Wfor all j in equations (4) and (5) gives
cc-1
(7) (P/W) =(e/$—1K,, (M/P)
(8) (W/P) =(/(—1i)K.. (M/P)
The first equation, which we shall refer to as the rnarku equation, gives the




















































































































from the point of view of firms. Unless firms have constant returns (.cl), an
increase in real money balances increases aggregate demand and requires an increase
in the markup.
The second equation, which we shall refer to as the real wage equation, gives
the equilibrium relation between real wages and real money balances from the point o4
view of unions. Unless the marginal disutility of work is constant (1), an Increase
in real money balances increases the derived demand for labor and requires an
increase in the real wage.
The equilibrium is characterised graphically in Figure 1. It is drawn in the
log(W/P) ,log(M/P)space so that both the markup and the real wage loci are linear.
If p is strictly greater than unity, the real wage locus is upward sloping if is
strictly greater then unity, the markup locus is downward sloping. The equilibrium
determines the level of the real wage and the level of real money balances and is
characterised by point A. Given equation (6), it determines output. Given nominal
money, it determines the price level.
It is useful, for later reference, to compare this equilibrium with the
equilibrium which would prevail if firms and unions had the same technology and
objective functions, but took prices and wages as given, that is, did not exploit
their monopoly power. We shall refer to this equilibrium as the competitive
equilibrium. The competitive equilibrium is very similar to the monopolistically
competitive one. The equations characterising it are identical to equations (7) and
(8) except for the absence of ($/(&—1)) in the first and (a/(—1)) in the second.
Firms do not use their monopoly power, so that their mark up is lower at any level of
output. Unions do not exert their monopoly power either, so that the real wage is
lower at any level of employment. The competitive loci are drawn in Figure 1. TheB
competitive equilibrium is given by point B. Comparing B and A shows the
monopolistically competitive equilibrium to have lower output ; whether it has higher
or lower real wages is ambiguous.
Our ultimate goal is to better understand the presence and the nature of the
dynamic effects of nominal money on wages, prices and output. What have we gained by
introducing monopolistic competition ? in a way, we appear to have gained very little
in the monopolistically competitive equilibrium1 just as in the competitive
equilibrium, nominal money is still neutral, leading to an instantaneous proportional
increase in wages and prices, and leaving output unchanged.
In another way, we are very close to having gained something. To see this, and
as an introduction to the next section, it is useful to rewrite equations (7) and (B)
in logarithmic form and to characterise the equilibrium in the price wage space.
Denoting by lower case letters the logarithms of upper case letters, equations (7)
and (8) become, with some reorganisation
(9) p =c+aw +(1—a)m; a a 1/s, a E (0,1)
(10) w =c+bp +(1—b)m; ba l—(—l) b 1
where c a (log($I(4—l)) +log(K))/and c. a log(oI(—l)) +log(K...)
The markup equation gives the nominal price as a linear combination of the
nominal wage and nominal money5. The coefficient on the wage, a, is the degree of
returns to scale. Unless firms operate under constant returns, an increase in m will







The real wage equation gives the nominal wage as a linear combination of the
nominal price and nominal money. The coefficient on the price, b, is less than unity
but is not necessarily positive. An increase in the price level, which decreases real
money balances and the demand for labor, requires a decrease in the real wage. If a
andare large enough, it may even require a decrease in the nominal wage. If both
a and pareclose to unity, a and b are also close to unity. If a and b are close to
unity, shifts in demand have little effect on markups and real wages respectively
we shall in what follows refer to a and b as reflecting the degrees of inflelblllty
of markups and real wages respectively
The equilibrium is characterised in the p, w space in Figure 2, for a given
value of a. The price rule has slope less than or equal to one ; if b is positive,
the wage rule has slope greater than or equal to one. The equilibrium is given by
point E.
It is useful for later to give a heuristic description of how this equilibrium
may be reached through a tatonnement process. Suppose that nominal money increases,
so that in Figure 2, the initial equilibrium is at A and the new equilibrium at E i
atinitial values of w and p, aggregate demand increases, increasing output and
employment. Worker; therefore, want a higher real wage. Given p, they want to go to
point B. Firms want a higher markup ; given w, they want to go to point B. These two
claims are obviously inconsistent. Attempts by workers and firm; to increase real
wages and markups only lead to increases in nominal wages and prices. This process
ends when both nominal prices and wages have increased in proportion to nominal money
so that real money balances are back to their previous level ; desired real wages and
desired markups are then again consistent and equilibrium is reached. A possible path
of adjustment in which prices and wages adjust in turn is ABC. .E in Figure 2. In this10
case, the less flexible real wages and mark ups, the slower the adjustment process.
This is only a tatonnement process ; we shall now see that staggering leads to a
similar process in real time.
II. Staggering and Demand Fluctuations
Most nominal prices —and wages— are set for discrete periods of time. For each
such period, price setters prefer the simplicity of a constant nominal price to both
a contingent price path or even a predetermined —but not necessarily constant— price
path. Moreover, nominal price changes do not take place all at the same time but
rather uniformly through time. This may be partly because of strategic timing
considerations on the part of some price setters. More often, it is simply the
unavoidable consequence of the existence of a large number of uncoordinated price and
wage setters. Some€imes predetermined prices or wages are part of explicit contracts;
more often, they are not.
The implication is that wage or price setters, when they change their wage or
price, experience a change in their relative wage or relative price. The actual
process of adjustment to a nominal shock is a complex one, involving changes in
relative wages, relative prices and real wages. To study it and keep the analysis
manageable, one must focus on one particular aspect of that process. One may for
example, concentrate on the interaction among price decisions, assuming continuous
wage setting ; this was done by Akeriof [1969]. One may instead concentrate on the
interaction among wage decisions, the 'wage wage spiral", assuming continuous price11
setting, as was done by Taylor (1980]. Siven our focus on the 'wage price spiral', we
focus on the staggering between wage decisions on the one hand and price decisions on
the other.
1) Pr i ce and WageRules Under St aggerj
Thisleads us to formalize the staggering of decisions in the following rather
mechanical but convenient way
Time is discrete. The economy is described in the same way as before ,except
for price and wage setting. All price decisions are taken every two periods, at even
times. Thus, nominal prices are set at time t for periods t and t+1, and so on. Wage
decisions are taken every two periods, at odd times, thus at t—1 for t—1 and t, and
so on. The unit period should be thought as fairly short, say of the order of a
month, so that after two months all price and wage decisions have all been freely
revised. The length of the period during which prices and wages are fixed is taken as
exogenous and so is the staggering structure7.
Firms and workers are assumed to satisfy demand at the quoted prices and wages
we shall return to this assumption below and characterize the conditions under which
it is indeed optimal for them to do so.
As all firms take price decisions at the same time, they all choose the same
price. it is given by
(11) pt(1/2)C (a Wt—i+ (1—a)m)+(a E(w+1 t) +(1—a)E(m.1t) >12
where the constant term is ignored for notational simplicity. E(t) denotes the
expectation of a variable conditional on information available at time t. p. denotes
the nominal price chosen at time t for t and t+1 ; similarly Wt—i denotes the nominal
wage chosen at time t—1 for t—1andt and is therefore the nominal wage still
prevailing at time t. Equation (11) is the natural extension of (9); it states that
the nominal price is a weighted average of the optimal price for time t, which
depends or the current nominal wage and current nominal money, and of the expected
value of the optimal price far t+1, which depends on expectations of the nominal wage
and nominal money far time t+1. Equation (11) implies that for each interval during
which the nominal price is fixed, the expected average markup is a non decreasing
function of expected average aggregate demand.
As all wage setters decide about wages at the same time, all wages are the same.
In a way similar to prices, the nominal wage chosen at time t—1 for example is given
by
(12)wt—i =(I/2)E(bpt.2+(1—b)m_1)+(bE(pt—1) +(1—b)E(mt—1)J
where the constant term is again ignored, for notational simplicity. The nominal wage
chosen at time t—1 is a weighted average of (1) the optimal wage for time t—1, which
depends on Pt—2, the price level still prevailing at time t—1, and on nominal money
at time t—1, and (2) of the expected optimal wage for t, which depends on the price
level and nominal money expected to prevail at time t, as of time t—1. Equation (12)
Implies that, for each period during which the nominal wage is fixed, the expected
average real wage is a non decreasing function of the expected average aggregate
demand for labor.13
The dynamic behavior of the economy is now characterised by equation! (11) and
(12),anda specification of the money process. I solve the system for a general
process for money in the appendix; in the text, I focus on the effects of an
unanticipated permanent increase in nominal money. it is a counterfactual and
unexciting experiment but one which shows most clearly the dynamics of the system.
2) The Adjustment of The Price Level
Starting from steady state, nominal money increases at time t0, from zero to dm
(by appropriate normalisation). The increase is both unanticipated and permanent.
What are its effects on prices over time ?
The answer is easy to derive under static expectations and helps develop the
intuition. Using (11) and (12) gives in this case
=(1—a)dm
(13)
=abt-2+ (1—ab)dm t= 2,4,...
At time t=O, after the increase in money, wages have not yet increased : firms
increase their nominal price only to the extent they want to increase their markup to
supply the higher level of output. Under constant returns, there is no increase at
time t0 as a=1. At time t=1, wages increase both because prices are higher and
because, unless b=1, a higher real wage is required to 5upply a higher level of
labor. At time t2, prices adjust again and soon.
We can think of the coefficient on Pt_2asthe degree of price level inertia
if it is close to one, nominal prices adjust slowly to an increase in nominal money.
Thus, under static expectations there is a direct relation between the degree of
pricelevel inertia, ab, and the inflexibility of mark ups and real wages, as14
measured by a and b. The more inflexible markups and real wages, the higher the
degree of price level inertia.
Under rational expectations, the price level path is instead given by (see
Appendix)
=(1—(1/2)a[1 —(1/4)ab(1+X)))dm, 0 1X
X Pt— +(1—X)dm ; tE2,4,...
(14)
where X E(1—/(1—ab))/(1+I(1—ab))and X has the following properties
ab ; X 0 1+ ab 0, X •1if ab •1
The initial jump in nominal prices is larger than under static expectations. The
degree of price level inertia is now given by X rather than by ab. X is an increasing
function of ab, but is smaller than ab. That the adjustment should be faster under
rational expectations is obviousat time t=0 for example, price setters take Into
account not only the increase in demand but the forthcoming increase in nominal wages
at time t1. Along the path, price and wage setters take account of current demand
and current prices and wages, but also of expected increases in prices and wages.
Although the adjustment is faster under rational expectations, there is still a
direct relation between the inflexibility of markups and real wages, measured by a
and b, and the degree of price level inertia, measured by ).Theprocess of
adjustment is well described as a wage price spiral in which the speed of the spiral
depends on the desire of workers and firms to increase or maintain their real wages
and markups in response to the increase in demand.
A numerical example of a path of adjustment is given in table 1, for a b
0.99.Table 1
The Eect of an Increase in Moelative and Nominal Prices.
Time p w w—p y average average
real wage*markup**
0 0.133 0.0 —0.1330.877 —0.076
0.009
1 .133 .247 .144 .877
007
2 .346 .247 —.100 .654
007
3 .346 .432 .085 .654
005
4 .508 .432 —.076 .492
006
5 .508 .572 .064 .492
003
6 .629 .572 —.057 .371
.004
7 .629 .678 .049 .371
003
8 .721 .678 —.043 .279
003
9 .721 .757 .036 .279
002
10 .790 .757 —.033 .210
003
11 .790 .817 .027 .210
.001
12 .842 .817 —.025 .158
002
a =b0.99
Allnumbers in the table should be multiplied by din
*Theaverage real wage" is the average value of the real wage for the two
period interval during which the nominal wage is fixed.
**The"average mark up" is the average value of the mark up during the two
period interval during which the nominal price is fixed.15
3) Real wages during the adjustment process
We start with a puzzle. After the increase in money, price setters desire a
higher markup, wage setters a higher rQal wage. Under static expectations,both sides
fail to take into account future movements in either prices or wages and are
systematically disappointed. This cannot happen however under rational expectations
in particular, as there is no unanticipated movement in money after t0,the rational
expectation path is, after t=O, a perfect foresight path. Thus, as equations(11) and
(12) hold for actual values of prices and wages, it must be the case that workers
must, for every interval during which nominal wages are fixed, obtain a higherreal
wage ; firms on the other hand must also, for everyinterval during which nominal
prices are fixed, obtain a higher markup. How can these be consistent?
Table 1 shows that they can be indeed be consistent (the algebra is given in the
appendix). They can be consistent because the two intervals described abovedo not
coincide but overlap : there is then a path of increases in nominal prices and wages
such that the average markup and the average real wage are higher in turn. This
paradoxical path is the result of the assumption of rational expectations ; the
relevant result is not the paradox, but the existence of a rational expectation path.
The other and directly related characteristic of the process of adjustment is
that there is no persistent deviation of the real wage from its equilibrium value
the real wage simply oscillates around this value as output returns to equilibrium°.
It is the very nature of the process of adjustment under staggering of wage and price
decisions which implies that there be no systematic relation between real wages and
output in response to demand shocks.
The two paths of adjustment, under static and rational expectations are








expectation path by the thick line. Note that the average nominal wage, denoted by ,
isalways on the w(p) locus, the average nominal price, denoted by i,isalways on
the p(w) locus.
4) 4ggjate Demand and Output
Until now we have assumed that firms and workers satisfy demand, so that along
the path of adjustment, output and employment are proportional to real money
balances. This may not be the caseeven after a monopolist has set a price, it has
the option of either supplying or rationing demand. To see when aggregate demand
determines the outcome, we must return to Figure 1 which is redrawn for convenience
as Figure 4.
The labor market equilibrium condition under monopolistic competition, which
gives real wages as an increasing function of real money, is drawn as LL ; the goods
market equilibrium condition, which gives markups as an increasing function of real
money, is drawn as 66. The path of adjustment following an increase in nominal money
is given by ABC.. .E : after an increase of nominal money, price setters increase
prices, increasing markups and decreasing real money balances, so that the economy
goes to point B ;in the following period, wage setters take the economy to point C
and so on,
Let us now draw the equilibrium loci under perfect competition, i.e if neither
firms nor unions exert their monopoly power .Thelabor market equilibrium locus is
drawn as LL', implying a lower real wage at any level of output, the goads market
equilibrium is drawn as GG', implying a lower markup at any level of output.
Consider now point F on the 66 locus, which gives the monapolisticaily competitive












































markup, and still have firms willing to supply this given level of demand. The answer
is that we can decrease the markup until price equals marginal cost ; this happens
precisely on the competitive equilibrium locus, at point F. Ifwedecrease the
markup further, firms will ration demand. The same reasoning applies to workers at
any level of employment we can decrease the real wage until it reaches its
competitive equilibrium value. Let us shade the region to the right of either LL or
66, in this shaded region, either firms or workers or both will ration demand
outside of this region, they will both satisfy it.
$ and o increase the amount the monopoly power of firms and workers respectively,
increase the size of the non shaded region and thus also make demand determination of
output more likely.
Note that monopolisticcompetition plays an important role here and does more
thanprovide a convenient price setting environment. To get demand determination of
Thus, demand will determine output and employment
entirely in the non shaded region. This is the case for
If there is some monopoly power in both goods and labor
monopolisticaily competitive equilibrium lies strictly
small enough increases in money will leave the path of
region ; whether this is the case for larger movements
general on the degree of substitution between goods and
determines the degree of monopoly power and the size of
of the change in nominal money and the parameters a and
of real wage movements during the process of adjustment
unity imply small oscillations of the real wage and the
likely that the path of adjustment remains outside the
if the path of adjustment lies
the path drawn in Figure 4.
markets, we know that the
inside that region, so that
adjustment entirely within the
in money will depend in
between labor types, as this
the region, and on the size
b, as they determine the size
Values of a and b close to
markup, and thus make it more
shaded region. Small values of18
output to both decreases and increases in demand, at least within some bounds, one
needs to start from an equilibrium in which, for whatever reason, price exceeds
marginal cost and the wage exceeds marginal utility of leisure. This is what
monopolistic competition provides here.
To summarize the results of this section, movements in money create, at the
initial pair of prices and wages, desired changes in relative prices (the real wage
and its inverse, the markup). After an increase in money, both relative prices are
too low firms desire a higher markup, unions a higher real wageafter a decrease
in money, they are both too high. As workers and firms reestablish in turn their
desired relative prices, nominal prices and wages adjust until aggregate demand
returns to its equilibrium value. If relative prices are relatively inflexible, the
movement of nominal prices is slow. During the process of adjustment, the real wage
oscillates around its equilibrium value. During the process of adjustment, movements
in aggregate demand, if they are not too large, determine output which returns
monotonically to its equilibrium value.19
III. Conclusion
We have seen that the process of adjustment of nominal prices to a change in
aggregate demand is well described as a wage price spiral. After an increase in
demand, attempts by workers and by firms to maintain or increase real wages and mark
ups lead to a general increase in nominal prices and wageswhichlast until output is
back to its equilibrium value. The smaller the desired increase in relative prices,
the slower the wage price spiral, the higher the degree of price level inertia.
There are at least two directions in which the model presented in this section
should be extended. The first is relatively straightforward and involves looking at a
richer menu o shocks, monetary policies and staggering structures
The model generates more interesting wage price dynamics if we allow for
monetary policy to respond to wage and price developments. Suppose for example that,
after the initial increase in nominal money, the monetary authority attempts to
maintain the higher level of output by partially accomodating the increase in nominal
prices. In this case, the higher the degree of accomodation, the stronger and the
longer lasting the wage price spiral. The monetary authority is indeed able to
maintain output at a higher level for a longer period of time but at the cost of a
higher initial increase in prices and a longer period of inflation. What the model
does not easily generate however is an accelerating wage price spiral. In the example
sketched above ,therate of inflation is largest at the beginning, when output and
employment are highest and desired increases in real wages and mark ups are largest,
and then decreases over time as output returns to normal. As the degree of
accomodation goes to unity, that is as the monetary authority accomodates one for one
nominal price increases, the result is not high inflation but an infinite value of20
the price level at the time of the initial increase in money. Learning by agents over
time of the goals of the monetary authority is needed to generate accelerating
inflation.
We have focused only on demand shocks. The model can be used to look at the
effects of supply shocks instead, be they technological shocks,aunion cost push or
other shocks to labor supply. An adverse technological shock requires a decrease in
the real wage and a decrease in output. At the initial level of output, real wages
and mark ups are inconsistent. This starts a wage price spiral which stops when real
money balances and output have decreased to the new equilibrium level. Here again,
efforts by the monetary authority to slow the decrease in output lead to more
inflation along the path of adjustment.
Finally, one would want to study the effects of more realistic staggering
structures, and in particular to relax the assumption of simultaneous price decisions
and simultaneous wage decision;. This can be done by extending the continuous
staggering structure suggested by Calvo E1982], Staggering of price decisions implies
that the elasticity of demand with respect to relative prices will now affect the
speed of adiustment of the price level. Staggering of wage decisions implies that the
elasticity of demand with respect to relative wages will also affect the speed of
adjustment of the price level1.
The second set of extensions is more difficult and more important.
For the model presented here to generate large and prolonged effects of
aggregate demand, bothand p must be close to unityfirms must be willing to
supply more output at a slightly higher markup, and unions must be willing to supply
more labor at a slightly higher real wage. This seems indeed to be true21
microeconomic evidence on markups suggest that they respond weakly to shifts in the
demand for goods and evidence on real wages suggest that real wages respond weakly
and slowly to shifts in demand for labor. But there are serious issues in reconciling
this observed behavior with what we know about technology and tastes i
Inour model, a constant desired markup (a is indeed justified if marginal
cost is constant (1). But there is much evidence that short run marginal cast is
not constant : inventory behavior points to substantial costs of changing production
(Blanchard 1983], overtime payments, incurred because of costs of changing the number
of workers employed, point to increasing short run marginal cost (Bus 198].
In our model, a constant desired real wage (b1) is justified if the marginal
disutility of employment is constant (f3l) .Iffluctuations in employment are
equally shared among workers, and if unions maximize the utility of their
representative members, then p—i corresponds to the inverse of the individual labor
supply elasticity with respect to the real wage. There is substantial microeconomic
evidence however that this elasticity is small, that the individual (p—i) is large.
This suggests two directions of research, both aimed at explaining why b may be close
to unity. The first, which has a long tradition, is to explain why the unions' p may
be smaller than individual p's. The second, which is now the subject of active
research, is to study the role of contracts in labor markets, and to see whether
contracts can explain why real wages seem to respond little to movements in
employment. If contracts take for example the form of free determination by the firm
of the level of employment subject to an agreed upon real wage employment schedule,
and if this real wage employment schedule is relatively flat, the qualitative results
of th paper are likely to go through2.22
Appendix
1)The Behavior of the Price Level
The behavior of prices is first derived for a general process for money, and
then for the specific process described in the text.
Using equation (12) for both t1 and t+1, taking E(w+11t)usingiterated
expectations and replacing in (10) gives
=(1/4)ab [Pt—2 + E(pt—1) + pt + E(p+2t)] + (1/4)z
where Zt is given by
Zta(1—b)Lm_1 + E(mt—1) + E(m+Jt) + E(m..2it)]
(Al)
+2(1—a)(m +E(m+Jt)]
Equation (Al) must be solved in two steps. The first is to solve for E(plt—1),
the second for pt. Denote by a star the expectation of a variable conditional on
information available at time t—l. Then taking expectations of both sides conditional
on information available at time t—1 and rearranging gives
(A2) ab p*t..2 + (2ab—4) p*t + ab P*t+2 Z*t
Let X be the smallest root of abX2 + (2ab—4) + ab =0,so that
=(1—/(1—ab))/(1+ I(1—ab))23
This root is an increasing function of ab, equal to 0 for abO and to 1 for
abl. Solving (A2) by factorization, subject to the constraint that pt does not
explode, gives
(A3) p*t= Xp*— +(X/ab)E XZ*t+2i
i0
so that
E(pt—1)X Pt2+ (/ab)E X E(z..-2 t—l)
i so
Thesecond step is to solve for pt. Deriving E(p+2lt) from (A3) and replacing
E(p+2t) and E(ptt—1) in (Al) gives pt
(4—ab(1+))pab(l+X)p—2 +Zt + XEX[E(z+2)t—l)+E(z+2+2t)]
I now consider the specific path of money described in the text. inincreasesat
time t=O from 0 to dmthe increase in unanticipated and permanent.
To solve 'fortheprice path, note that for t>0, there is no uncertainty and thus
(A3) holds 'for actual values of p and z rather than for their expectations. Note also
that, for t>0
I
(X/ab) EXZt÷2 (l—)dm, so that
i =0
Pt*2 = X pt +(1—X)dm for t '0
This gives in particular, for t0, 2 as a function of po. Equation (Al) in turn
provides, for t0, another relation between po and P2. Noting that E(po)—1)0 and
E(p2)0)p2, we have24
(1—(1/4)ab) Po(1/4)abp2+E1—a+(1/2)a(1—b)]dm
Solving the two equations in paandP2 gives the following characterization of
the price level path
• (1 —(1/2)aEl —(1/4)ab(1+X)])dni
Pt ) Pt—a + (1—X)dm for t=2,4,...
2)TheBehavioroft he R ealWag
LetXt be the real wage at time t ; from equation (12) at time t—1 and t+1, and
from the above characterization of prices,
Xo pa — po <0
—pt= [(1/2)b(l+X)—1](p—din)
a,b 1 (1/2)b(1+X) —1< 0 > 0
Pt+2 =E(1/2)b(1+(1/X))—l)(pt*2
—din)
From the definition of X, we have
1+ (1 /X ) ) =1+ (1 + / (1 —'ab) ) / (1 —/(1—ab ) ) =2/(1—v'( 1—ab)
sothat (1/2)b(1+(1/X))b/(1—/(1—ab))
a 1 (1/2)b(1+(1/X)) ab/(1 —/(1'ab))
ab (1 —/(1—ab))/(1+ /(1—ab))
(1/2)b(1+(1/X)) —Ia<1+ /(1—ab)) —1 /(1—ab) a0 Xt+2 < 0
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Footnotes
See forexample"A Survey ofInflationTheory," by Fl. Brofenbrenner and F. Holtzman,
written in 1965.
2 Thispoint was in fact made many years before the rational expectation
"revolution" by W. Feliner (1959, pp 235—236).
The model is agnostic as to whether unions are maximising the utility of their
representative member, or maximising some other objective function. This however
affects the interpretation and the likely value of the parameterbelow, raising an
issue to which we shall return later.
As we take the number of firms as given, we do not need to introduce explicitly
the fixed cost faced by each firm. The analysis in the text is consistent with the
presence o4 such a fixed cost, Thus while we rule out decreasing marginal cost, we do
not rule out decreasing average cost.
Whenever we refer to the nominal price, the reader is to understand, whenever
relevant, the logarithm of the nominal price. The same applies to the nominal wage
and nominal money.
In the absence of staggered price and wage setting, the equilibrium, each
period, is the equilibrium described in Section I. Thus, dynamics arise in this model
only from the presence of staggered price and wage setting. Eliminating all other
sources of dynamics allows to focus more simply on the dynamic effects of price and
wage staggering.
The staggering structure we consider is particularly vulnerable to the criticism
that it would not survive endogenization of staggering decisions. It is clearly in
the interest of firms to coordinate price changes with wage changes. Feplacing the28
decisions would be more attractive in this respect.It would however complicate the
algebra substantially. For further discussion and work on endogenous staggering, see
Fethkeand Policano (1984)
Equation (11) is nottherule which comes out of expected profit maximisation by
firms over periods t and t+1, subject to the constraint that the nominal price be the
same in both periods, and the equilibrium condition that all relative prices be equal
to one. It may be useful to compare the two rules in the simple case of constant
returns to scale.
Under constant returns, (11) reduces to
=(1/2)(Wt—i +E(w+1t))
whereas the price obtained from explicit profit maximisation is, assuming the
discount factor on second period profit to be equal to(letters now denote levels,
not logarithms):
=KE(Mt/(Mt+BE(M+(t))(4 +
Comparingthe two expressions shows three main differences. The first is the presence
of the discount rate. The second is the presence of the covariance of Ni and W at t+1.
The third is that P is an arithmetic rather than a geometric average of W at time t
and t+1. An other way of stating the differences between the two rules is that, under
the correct rule, the price is an average of current and expected wages, with weights
which depend on current money and the joint disribution offuturemoney and future
nominal wages.
If the unitperiod is short, sothat (3isclose to one and E(M.1 It) is close toN1,
then(11) isa qood approximationtothecorrect price rule. Our reason for using29
that the approximation is not the source of the results we focus on.
This suggests that explaining the behavior of relative prices, quite apart from
nominal rigidities should be high on the research agenda. This appears indeed to have
been the approach followed in the 1960's (as summarized by Tobin U970] for example).
Research was focused on documenting and explaining the slow and small reaction of
wages to unemployment, the slope of the short run Phillips curve, or the
inflexibility of mark ups. Nominal price and wage inertia were then obtained not from
staggering but from assumptions about expectations.
10 Theoscillations are partly the result of the simple staggering structure we
use. For more complex structures, such as continuous uniform staggering of price and
wage decisions, the aggregate real wage may not oscillate at all.
11 Onecan also allow for an n—step (rather than one—step as in the text)
production process and allow for staggering of price decisiosn along the production
process. This has two relevant implications. It increases the degree of price level
inertia and may generate systematic movements in the structure of relative prices in
response to changes in nominal money. See Blanchard [19831.
'Akerlofand Yelleri E19GJ have recently constructed a macroeconomic model along
these lines ; they formalize the labor market as characterized by efficiency wages.